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Competition Law Limits on R ide Sharing E nterprises –
Taking into Account the Experience in I ndia
Max Huffman*

Abstract New economy competition policy is on the
forefront of enforcers’ minds across the globe, with numerous
competition agencies engaged in competition advocacy efforts
regarding the sharing economy generally or ride sharing
specifically. In a sharing economy firm, extra-firm contracting
may be as efficient as that occurring intra-firm. By reducing search
and transaction costs, the sharing economy enables transactions
that could not occur in a pre-internet economy. The sharing
economy grew strongly in developed economies, all of which
were burdened with legacy permitting systems such as taxicab
medallions or zoning regulations and other oversight limiting
public lodging. The promise in economies with substantial
development ahead of them is much greater. However, with highly
diffuse suppliers and consumers contracting through enterprises
with substantial market presence, areas of competition policy
concern include conspiracies, exercises of bargaining power, and
productive agreements that may nonetheless limit competition
and thereby require careful analysis of overall competitive effects.
Finally, there is the possibility of an agreement creating both
efficiencies and threatening competitive consequences, which
must be evaluated holistically to appreciate its overall impacts. No
clear competition law violation will exist in all cases. However,
continual attention to areas of concern will be warranted for the
foreseeable future.
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I. I ntroduction
The sharing economy has changed how we work and transact globally.1 New
economy competition policy is on the forefront of enforcers’ minds across
the globe. In the European Union (‘the EU’) and the United Kingdom (‘the
UK’), detailed reports on competition and market structure in digital markets spell out enforcement priorities. 2 The United States (‘the US’) Federal
Trade Commission produced a detailed sharing economy report in 20163
and created its ‘Technology Enforcement Division’ to investigate, among
other things, digital platform markets.4 The Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (‘the OECD’) has made digital markets, and
sharing economy enterprises specifically, the foci of its competition forum,
1

2

3

4

See, Niam Yaraghi and Shamika Ravi, ‘The Current and Future State of the Sharing
Economy’ (Brookings India Impact Series, 2017) 4 <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/sharingeconomy_032017final.pdf> accessed 9 December 2019.
Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and Heike Schweitzer, Competition
Policy for the digital era: Final report (European Commission Directorate General for
Competition, 2019) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.
pdf> accessed 9 December 2019; Jason Furman et al, Unlocking Digital Competition:
Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel (Competition and Markets Authority,
2019)
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf>
accessed 9 December 2019.
Federal Trade Commission, The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants,
and Regulators (2016) 11 <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-regulators-federal-trade-commission-staff/p151200_ftc_staff_report_on_the_sharing_economy.pdf> accessed 3 July 2019
(FTC Report).
Federal Trade Commission, ‘FTC Technology Enforcement Division’ (2019) <https://
www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-competition/inside-bureau-competition/
technology-enforcement-division> accessed 9 March 2020; Federal Trade Commission,
‘FTC’s Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force to Monitor Technology Markets’
(Press Release, 2019) <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/02/ftcs-bureau-competition-launches-task-force-monitor-technology> accessed 9 December 2019.
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and enforcers around the globe have contributed their insights and experience to those programs.5 As of this writing, the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (‘UNCTAD’) is coordinating a book project on
the digital economy, including the sharing economy. Competition agencies
in several jurisdictions have drafted their own or contracted out reports on
the implications of the sharing economy for competition and consumer protection.6 According to a 2019 International Competition Network survey,
at least 10 competition agencies around the globe, including both the oldest
and best funded (such as the US Federal Trade Commission) and the newer/
less wealthy (such as the Croatia Competition Agency AZTN and Panama’s
Competencia), had engaged in competition advocacy efforts regarding the
sharing economy generally or ride sharing specifically.7
The Competition Commission of India (‘the CCI’) has given close attention to these markets, by way of conducting a recent market study on e-commerce, including attention to the platform economy (excluding ride-sharing),8
and contributing reports to last year’s OECD roundtable9 and to a recent
UNCTAD meeting.10 As the Chairperson of the CCI noted in a recent speech,
[W]e are witnessing the emergence of the “digital economy”. The dawn
of this new economy has brought with it alterations in the contours of
market, transformations in the ways of doing business, ways of communication, and of transactions. Digital technology is transforming
markets at an unprecedented scale and pace. Business models, market
access mechanisms, ways of communication and transactions are all
being reshaped by digital mediation. The ongoing shift of markets
5

6

7

8

9

10

See, for example, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Taxi, ride-sourcing and
ride-sharing services (DAF/COMP/WP2(2018)1, 2018) <https://one.oecd.org/document/
DAF/COMP/WP2(2018)1/en/pdf> accessed 9 December 2019 (OECD Report).
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, The Sharing Economy and
the Competition and Consumer Act (2015) <https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/
Sharing%20Economy%20-%20Deloitte%20Report%20-%202015.pdf>
accessed
9
December 2019.
International Competition Network Advocacy Working Group, ‘Report on ICN Members
Recent Experiences (2015-2018) in Conducting Competition Advocacy in Digital Markets’
(2019) <content/uploads/2019/06/AWG_AdvDigitalMktsReport2019.pdf> accessed 9
December 2019.
Competition Commission of India, Market Study on e-Commerce in India (2020) <https://
www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/whats_newdocument/Market-study-on-e-Commerce-inIndia.pdf> accessed 9 December 2019.
See, note by India in Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition
Committee (n 5).
Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, Emerging issues
before CCI relating to Digital Economy – Contribution by The Republic of India (2019)
<https://unctad.org/meetings/en/Contribution/ciclp18th_cont_India.pdf>
accessed
9
December 2019 (UNCTAD Submission).
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towards a digital platform-centric configuration has opened up new
opportunities while also posing new challenges for both market participants and regulators.11

Individuals transact with individuals, through sharing economy enterprises, for service contracts on a one-off basis; each service contract is an
atom in any definable service market.12 With highly diffuse suppliers and
consumers contracting through enterprises with substantial market presence, areas of competition policy concern are many. These include conspiracies governing competitively sensitive subjects such as price, output, and
quality; exercises of bargaining power conferred by a dominant position,
including both the ability to establish a supra-competitive price and the ability to discriminate in price among similarly situated consumers; and productive agreements that may nonetheless limit competition and thereby require
careful analysis of overall competitive effects.
Conspiracy, productive agreement, and abuse of dominance are unlikely
to arise together. The competitive concern that emerges appears to depend on
how we define the structure of a sharing economy enterprise. If we identify
a centralised, single firm, with substantial market presence, pricing, output,
and quality decisions, including differences in offerings as among similarly
situated consumers, this presents a concern for abuse of dominance. As an
example, a ride-sharing enterprise that acquires 50% or more of the share
for ride hailing in a particular market and is determined by operation of
law to employ its drivers and to sell services to consumers in competition
with taxi operators, might readily be considered to have dominant market
position.13 This abuse of dominance may be manifested upstream as well as
in the labour input market, in which individual suppliers compete for transactions and lack bargaining power vis-à-vis the enterprise.14
If, by contrast, we identify a nearly infinitely diffuse set of suppliers,
combined in a loose alliance for marketing and distribution purposes, with
the sharing economy enterprise filling the role of a joint agent, decisions on
11

12

13

14

Ashok Kumar Gupta, ‘Opening Remarks’ (Antitrust Global Seminar Series, New Delhi,
8 February 2019) para 7 <http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/speeches/Opening_
Remarks.pdf?download=1> accessed 9 December 2019.
See, Mark Anderson and Max Huffman, ‘The Sharing Economy Meets the Sherman Act:
Is Uber a Firm, a Cartel, or Something In Between?’ (2017)(3) Columbia Business Law
Review 859 (outlining six defining features of the sharing economy).
This would be the case if ride sharing drivers were treated as employees, as they recently
have been held to be by the Cour de Cassation in France. See, Judgment n°374 (19-13.316)
ECLI:FR:CCAS:2020:SO00374 (Courde Cassation, Chambre sociale).
See, Julian Nowag, ‘UBER between Labour and Competition Law’ (2016) 3 Lund Student
EU Law Review 95 (identifying the Scylla and Charybdis of abuse of dominance and
anti-cartel prohibitions facing sharing economy enterprises).
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price, output, and quality reached through the enterprise represent agreements among competitors.15 This is the form of sharing economy enterprise
that ride sharing enterprises purport to be – and, in markets including the
US, have largely succeeded in being treated as.16 Such agreements among
suppliers tend to be treated, on their face, as violations of competition law,
with criminal penalties in those jurisdictions that impose them and substantial fines elsewhere.17 The strength of this rule is such that agreements are
considered void ab initio or on a per se basis (with the choice of Latin phrases
jurisdiction dependent).
Finally, there is the possibility of a productive venture, an agreement
creating both efficiencies and threatening competitive consequences, which
must be evaluated holistically to appreciate its overall impacts. This is where
courts’ treatment of ride sharing enterprises can be expected to be evaluated.
Regulators and courts will be reluctant to allege and to find hard core cartel
agreements buried in what many consider to be innovative twists on production and employment, which may promise substantial welfare gains – with
benefits perhaps distributed among a new class of entrepreneurs, historically
dependent on others for employment opportunities.
On a broad analysis of competition policy concerns arising in ride sharing, no one claim stands out as the obvious competition harm. Several possible claims exist, however, depending on the structure of the enterprise, the
particular jurisdiction’s laws governing both competition and employment,
and the strength of the market in which it is situated. The nature of the competition law concerns calls to mind the adage, “where there is smoke, there is
fire”; while no clear competition law violation will exist in all cases, continual attention to areas of concern will be warranted for the foreseeable future.

II. A ntitrust P rinciples

of

Single Firms

The structure of sharing economy enterprises calls into question the legal
rules and economic understanding surrounding the business firm. In an
15
16

17

ibid.
United States National Labor Relations Board – Office of the General Counsel, Uber
Technologies, Inc Cases 13-CA-163062, 14-CA-158833, and 29-CA-177483 (Advice
Memorandum, 2019) 3 <https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4582bd1a2e>
accessed 9 December 2019 (“Applying the common-law agency test, we conclude that the
UberX and UberBLACK drivers were independent contractors”); See contra, California
Assembly Bill No. 5 2019 <https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5> accessed 9 December 2019 (broadening the definition of
‘employee’ under California state law).
See, Anderson and Huffman (n 12) 902-04.
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old-economy enterprise, the firm is easily defined as a centrally owned and
organised enterprise that owns its own capital stock and employs its labour
force, subject to well established laws governing the employment relationship. The old economy firm achieves efficiency benefits from integration that
decrease as its scale becomes unwieldy. In a free market economic system,
where the law favours competition to centralised planning, the firm is permitted to grow organically without intervention from regulators. As a matter
of economic policy, including competition policy, the firm (once defined) is
less likely to be restricted in its intra-firm operations. This has relevance
to an analysis of the antitrust consequences of the sharing economy, which
presents ambiguity as to the definition of a firm, by adopting attributes of
old-economy firms, both in terms of labour force and capital stock.

A.  The Law – United States and India
The concept of the single firm is the barrier between competition law theories based on agreement and those based on single-firm dominance. In the
US, this is a distinction between Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 1890 (‘the Sherman Act’).18 Multiple firms are rarely challenged under Section 2 (although a claim of conspiracy to monopolise is theoretically possible).19 India’s Competition Act, 2002 (‘the Competition Act’)
likewise follows this structure, outlawing certain agreements in Section 3
and certain activities by dominant firms in Section 4. 20
The single firm-multiple firm divide breaks down in the presence of a ‘collective dominance’ theory, which the EU has nominally followed and which
is expressly included in many national competition laws.21 Under a collective
dominance theory, more than one firm collectively making up a dominant
share of the market can be challenged for conduct that otherwise serves
as the basis for liability for an individually dominant firm. In this manner,
it is closely comparable to a theory of harm based on ‘tacit collusion’ or
18
19

20

21

15 USC, ss 1, 2.
See, 15 USC, s 2 (outlawing “combin[ing] or conspire[ing]… to monopolize”. See generally, Joseph P Bauer et al, Kintner’s Federal Antitrust Law (first published in 1980,
Anderson Publishing Company 2013) 16-154 (the offense of conspiracy under s 2 is superfluous because the same facts will support a violation of s 1, which is an easier claim to
prove).
The Competition Act 2002, ss 3, 4. Most, if not all competition law systems around the
globe follow a similar structural divide between agreements and single-firm dominance.
See, for example, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts 101, 102; the
Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, arts 13, 17.
In India, collective dominance is not recognised as a basis for liability under s 4 of the
Competition Act. See, Dish TV India Ltd v Hathway Cable and Datacom Ltd 2014 SCC
OnLine CCI 35.
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‘oligopoly conduct’, which causes consternation in the US system but does
not present a basis for a violation of the US antitrust laws.22 Collective dominance theory erodes the distinction between concerted and unilateral conduct, but as a practical matter is uninteresting in the context of the sharing
economy. The ‘concert’ in the sharing economy is so thickly populated that
no theory of joint action, other than express collusion, might provide a basis
for liability under any competition law system.
Thus, the unilateral conduct-concerted conduct divide is a worldwide
phenomenon in applying competition principles to the sharing economy.
Concert, if it exists, is a function of individual competitors reaching agreement through the sharing economy enterprise, using the technology platform
as a meeting place for reaching an agreement on price, output, or other facet
of competition. In an ordinary market, concert among thousands or millions
of highly diffuse providers would be exceedingly unlikely. However, the ease
of transactions made possible by a sharing economy works equally well in
terms of coordinating a conspiracy among horizontal competitors.
Dominance, if it exists, should never be a function of a single supplier
in a sharing economy market achieving dominant share. Instead, it should
be a function of the sharing economy enterprise achieving dominance by
locking up a substantial share of the matches between suppliers and consumers. Dominance is likely to be measured in terms of the number of matches
between suppliers and consumers transacting on the particular technology
platform. For example, in ride sharing, if in a particular month in a particular geographic location there are 1 million matches, the dominant firm might
have 500,000, or whatever proportion the particular jurisdiction determines
triggers status as a dominant firm under its laws.

B.  Single Firm Analysis under the Competition Act
There is limited authority on single firm analysis under India’s Competition
Act. The Competition Act is more explicit than US law in its distinguishing of single entities from associations of enterprises for purposes of cartel claims. The Competition Act includes a definition of ‘enterprise’, and
defines the concerted conduct prohibition as handling agreements involving
“an enterprise or association of enterprises.”23 This formed the core of the
defendants’ argument in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. CCI, ultimately

22

23

See, Ioannis Kokkoris, ‘The Development of the Concept of Collective Dominance in the
ECMR’ (2007) 30 World Competition 419, 420.
The Competition Act 2002, ss 1, 3.
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failing to convince the court that four competing insurers and their regulator
could not be considered together as a single enterprise. 24
One author analysed the development of the single enterprise doctrine
under the competition law of India, dating to the Monopolies and Restrictive
Trade Practices Act, 1969.25 Jain details the progressive definition of ‘enterprise’ in a series of revisions to the competition laws, including the degree to
which that definition encompasses government entities. Jain then explains,
in depth, the 2017 National Insurance Companies decision. In Jain’s interpretation, the court in National Insurance Companies noted the individual
board management of the respective defendants and the lack of regulatory
involvement in the management of the companies. The case thus reflects a
determination that the enterprises and their regulator were not operating
together as a single entity.
It is possible that the broad definition of enterprise in Section 1 of the
Competition Act requires Indian courts to reach further than a court or
regulator in the US would. An argument that a cartelist might be a single
entity with its regulator would be frivolous under US law.26 The broader
definition of an enterprise in India could perhaps be traced to the nationalisation of insurance in 2002 (the same year the Competition Act took effect),
which presented a unique single entity problem. 27 In spite of that nationalisation, the broad enterprise definition in the Competition Act – covering
departments of government – reached the individual cartelists. 28 The court’s
analysis on the merits of the single entity question is entirely consistent with
the US approach. Such a recognition of the lack of common purpose – what
Anderson has called the sharing of profits and losses – both among the
cartelists and between the cartelists and the regulator, is in keeping with the
US approach to the single entity doctrine. 29
Thus, while the law in India is not well developed, we see strong analogues between the single entity analysis in India and that in the US, where
24

25

26

27
28
29

National Insurance Co Ltd v Competition Commission of India (2017) Comp LR 1, paras
5, 12 (National Insurance Company).
Chirayu Jain, ‘Single Economic Entity Doctrine in India’ (2017) <https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3184957> accessed 9 December 2019.
Though an analogy might be made to a state action or regulatory immunity defense in
US law. cf Parker v Brown 1943 SCC OnLine US SC 4 : 87 L Ed 315 : 317 US 341 (1943)
(US Supreme Court holds that a state-mandated cartel is exempt from antitrust challenge);
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v Billing 2007 SCC OnLine US SC 59 : 551 US 264
(2007) (securities laws preclude antitrust claims in case of ‘clear repugnance’).
National Insurance Company (n 24) para 12.
National Insurance Company (n 24) para 13 [citing s 2(h) of the Competition Act].
cf Mark Anderson, ‘The Enigma of the Single Entity’ (2014) 16 University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Business Law 497, 526-47 (explaining conflicting single entity decisions).
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the law has been developed over many decades of experience with a variety of common ownership situations. The analysis in the following subpart
describes the importance of the single entity question to deciding the application of competition law principles in ride sharing.

C.  The Antitrust Firm in the Sharing Economy
Anderson and I discuss the sharing economy and its impact on theories regarding the antitrust firm in our 2017 article, ‘The Sharing Economy Meets the
Sherman Act: Is Uber a Firm, a Cartel, or Something in Between?’.30 There,
we identify the central tension in a legal theory built on transaction costs
in extra-firm contracting: antitrust law favours intra-firm conduct because
it is easy to coordinate and to manage efficiently, and that efficiency promises benefits to consumers.31 Extra-firm contracting offers less central control
and reduced efficiencies, so coordination is more likely to result in consumer
harm.32 In a modern platform industry, however, extra-firm contracts can
be concluded as efficiently as can intra-firm contracts in traditional industry structures, with similarly substantial coordination of operations among
contracting parties. The benefits flowing from intra-firm contracts are no
longer unique.
Anderson and I go further than merely observing that extra-firm contracting may be as efficient as that occurring intra-firm. We contend that
by reducing search and transaction costs, the sharing economy “enable[s]
transactions that could not occur in a pre-internet economy.”33 The central innovation in platform-based contracting is to eliminate the transaction
costs that previously made one-off contracts impossible. The result is that
nearly infinitely diffuse competitors – in the case of ride sharing, both drivers
(competing for customers) and passengers (competing for rides) – are able to
centralise their operations to achieve efficiencies of scale, while remaining
competitors with regard to much of what they do.34 These areas of remaining competition include “matters such as where to operate, what parts of
the day to offer services, and . . . when to service or replace the vehicles.”35
Ride sharing drivers compete in other ways, both articulable and less so,
including cleanliness, friendliness, diving ability, and provision of additional
products or services (such as a bottle of water in the cup-holder). Passengers
30
31
32
33
34
35

See, Anderson and Huffman (n 12).
See generally, Anderson and Huffman (n 12) 888.
Anderson and Huffman (n 12) 888-89.
Anderson and Huffman (n 12) 882.
Anderson and Huffman (n 12) 883-84.
Anderson and Huffman (n 12) 884.
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also compete, through whatever they can do to maximise their ratings to
make drivers more inclined to respond to their summons. In theory, these
ratings competitions should allow a nearly infinite number of facets of competition among drivers and passengers alike. It is even possible to imagine a
form of price competition, based on tipping (by passengers) or discounting
(by drivers). Practically speaking, however, objective facets of competition
are greatly limited in service of the efficiency of commodification.
By reflecting both the central operational control of a single firm and the
highly competitive nature of a market characterised by sole proprietorships,
sharing economy firms, including ride sharing enterprises, are ambiguous
in their competition policy implications. Anderson and I diagrammed the
problem as shown in Figure 1.

Y Axis:
Degree of
risk-sharing

Single entity (equal
parts coordination
and integration)

Integration without
coordination (nonfirm)
Zone of limited
competition policy
concern (limited
coordination,
substantial
integration)

Harm from
coordination
counterbalanced
against efficiencies
of integration

Zone of
presumptive or per
se liability
(substantial
coordination,
limited integration) Cartel

X Axis:
Degree of
coordination

Figure 1
The figure demonstrates that efficiency increases as erstwhile competitors move upward along the Y-axis toward greater risk sharing, a concept
detailed in the US Supreme Court’s Copperweld decision as one driven by
the sharing of profits and losses.36 Under the current state of law in most
jurisdictions, competition law recognises either a single entity or multiple
36

Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp 1984 SCC OnLine US SC 147 : 81 L Ed
2d 628 : 467 US 752 (1984), 768-72 (coordinated activity between parent company and
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competitors, a binary categorisation that can mean the difference between
liability or immunity.37 Studying the sharing economy shows that risk sharing is instead a matter of degree, with integration sufficient to achieve single
firm efficiencies only at the far reach (the high point on the Y-axis) and
disintegration sufficient to prevent any efficiencies from being realised at the
extreme low point on the Y-axis. Sharing economy enterprises are arrayed
along the Y-axis according to their particular terms.
Anderson and I analysed the state of several leading enterprises at the time
of our 2017 publication, 38 but with variations in terms of service, any such
array is subject to substantial change. (For example, between the drafting
and publication of our 2017 article, one important term of service – tipping –
changed in the Uber enterprise, leading to a different bargaining dynamic).39
The X-axis on Figure 1 is well understood in all competition law systems,
showing the degree of coordination among competitors. At the extreme (far
right) point, coordination reflects a cartel agreement; at the far-left point,
there is a lack of coordination reflective of full competition; and in the
middle, there is coordination on less sensitive matters such as information
sharing. Developed competition policy systems have long appreciated that
this is a sliding scale of coordination,40 although the binary per se/rule of
reason distinction remains in both statutory enactments and common law
interpretations.
Anderson’s and my significant contribution to the analysis of the antitrust
firm, based on our study of the sharing economy, was that each agreement
should be analysed both in terms of its place on the X-axis and its place on
the Y-axis, rather than deciding ab initio that a particular enterprise was
either exempt from scrutiny for all cases (because a single firm) or was subject to scrutiny in all cases (because a multiplicity of competitors). The pricing term in a normal sharing economy enterprise, most notably the price per
ride that all ride sharing drivers agree to charge, would be a price fix – but

37
38
39
40

wholly-owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for the purpose of
Sherman Act s 1 analysis; single enterprise incapable of conspiracy).
Anderson and Huffman (n 12) 917.
Anderson and Huffman (n 12) 927.
Anderson and Huffman (n 12) 874.
See, for example, California Dental Association v Federal Trade Commission 1999 SCC
OnLine US SC 51 : 143 L Ed 2d 935 : 526 US 756 (1999) (no categorical line between
restraints giving rise to intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effects; inquiry
should look to restraints’ circumstances, details and logic).
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because of the sharing of risk among the erstwhile competitors under the
Uber umbrella, it should be subject to rule of reason scrutiny.41
Due largely to the features Anderson and I analysed in 2017, the sharing
economy grew strongly in developed economies, all of which were burdened
with legacy permitting systems such as taxicab medallions or zoning regulations, and other oversight limiting public lodging. However, the promise in
economies with substantial development ahead of them is much greater, also
for the reasons we describe. Either, or both, of (1) a lack of historic permission for private enterprise, and (2) the failings of centralised economic direction, have left many economies without competitively attractive offerings in
industries affected by the sharing economy. At the same time, these economies have substantial pent-up entrepreneurial supply waiting to be unleashed
through activity that can arbitrage restrictions on entrepreneurship. Sharing
economy enterprises can capitalise on this untapped supply with the technical improvements allowing the efficiency of integrated ownership, producing
entire industries that may have been lacking.

III. R ide Sharing M arkets – United States

and

I ndia

Ride sharing has a venerable history around the globe as a non-market
or grey-market alternative to taxis and car ownership. Examples include
carpooling by commuters. ‘Slugging’ is a form of carpooling found in
Washington DC (USA) that involves lines of commuters waiting at known
pick-up locations for rides on the major highways either south or north of
town, enabling drivers to take advantage of the High Occupancy Vehicle
lanes and avoid congestion, with a history dating at least to the Arab oil
embargo. The phrase ‘gypsy cabs’ refers to unlicensed (and therefore law
violating) taxicabs in the US. According to sharing economy enterprise
Wikipedia, other terms – ‘black cabs’ in China, ‘white cards’ in Hong Kong,
‘taxi pirate’ or ‘pirrataxi’ (Mexico, Scandinavia), among others – are in use
around the world, demonstrating the worldwide ubiquity of the practice.42
Ride sharing is also the best known example of a sharing economy enterprise, with Uber (US), Ola (India), Didi (China), Grab (Vietnam), and other
app-based enterprises achieving massive scale in a short period of time.
41

42

Anderson and Huffman (n 12) 927-29. Anderson and I concluded that the quick-look rule
of reason was appropriate for Uber, although that conclusion is likely relaxed in light of
permissive app-based tipping.
‘Illegal Taxicab Operation’ (Wikipedia, 2019) <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illegal_taxicab_operation> accessed 26 May 2019. When writing about the sharing economy, I am
more willing than in ordinary scholarship to rely on Wikipedia, itself a sharing economy
enterprise, for easily verifiable factual observations.
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In economies with substantial room for growth, such as that in India,
the sharing economy has particular promise. Early development of a robust
transportation infrastructure is likely one of the strongest explanations for
the success in US economic development in the 19th and 20th centuries. Ride
sharing allows for that transportation infrastructure to grow in a grass
roots manner in economies not yet so developed. In addition, infrastructure
growth presents substantial danger for corruption when managed centrally,
the threat of which is reduced when the growth happens at the grass roots
level. In light of these observations, it should not be a surprise that the ride
sharing industry in India is characterised by a large number of competitors
and, by all appearances, substantial competitiveness.

A.  Taxis and Ride Sharing – United States
The US ride sharing market has achieved substantial penetration into consumer transportation generally, with reports that 36% of people in the US
had used a ride sharing app in 2018.43 Survey results also show that 97%
of US consumers have heard of ride sharing services.44 Uber and Lyft are
a functional oligopoly nationwide in matching services, with Uber at 64%
share and Lyft at 33% share (approximate figures) of a market presumably
based on rides taken.45 Market share, as determined by the number of drivers on an app, is 87.6% for Uber and 75.1% for Lyft, reflecting substantial
‘multi-homing’ (whereby one driver offers services on more than one app).
According to a news report summarising one survey, another metric, business travel receipts, shows a substantial but narrowing gap between Uber
and Lyft, with Uber at 79% and Lyft at 21% of the share of business travel
receipts (apparently in the US).46
On a worldwide basis, determined by the amount of investment in their
enterprises prior to initial public offerings (in January 2019), Uber was first
with $24 billion in investment, with Chinese firm Didi following closely with
$21 billion, Southeast Asian firm Grab third with $7.1 billion, Lyft fourth
with $5 billion, and Indian firm Ola Cabs fifth with $3.4 billion.47

43

44
45
46

47

‘Ridesharing services in the US – Statistics & Facts’ (Statista, 2019) 14 <https://www.
statista.com/study/54807/ridesharing-services-in-the-us/> accessed 20 July 2019.
(n 43) 19.
(n 43) 11. Statista fails to explain the basis for its market share calculations.
Wolf Richter, ‘Uber and Lyft are gaining even more market share over taxis and rentals’
(Business Insider, 30 July 2018) <https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-lyft-are-gainingeven-more-market-share-over-taxis-and-rentals-2018-7> accessed 9 December 2019.
‘Lyft’ (Statista, 2019) 7 <https://www.statista.com/study/58248/lyft/> accessed 9
December 2019.
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In terms of global revenue, Lyft’s – drawn from Canada and the US only
– was $2.18 billion in 2018.48 Lyft gave 551 million rides in North America
in 2018.49 Uber’s worldwide revenue, drawn from North America as well
as other continents (and thus not a good comparison to Lyft, in terms of
relevant market share), was $11.3 billion in 2018. 50 Uber gave 5.3 billion
worldwide rides in 2018.51
Local share of ride sharing enterprises in the US is more textured than the
national or worldwide comparisons disclose. In terms of consumer spend (on
an average per-person basis), San Francisco is the largest local ride-sharing
market in the US, followed by Boston, New York, Washington D.C., and
Philadelphia.52 In these five largest markets, the closest competition is in
San Francisco, with Lyft customers averaging $89 monthly spend and Uber
customers averaging $110 monthly spend. In every case, the monthly average
spend on Uber exceeds Lyft, with the greatest distinction – $95 versus $55
– in Boston.53
Relative to traditional taxis, ride sharing has made substantial inroads.
One news source, drawing data from a provider of business travel expense
management services, notes an increase from the first quarter of 2014 to the
second quarter of 2018 in the share of business travel ground transportation
receipts from 8% (2014) to 70.5% (2018).54 This 70.5% statistic leaves the
remainder of the market divided among rental cars and traditional taxis,
whose share decreased over the same period from 55% to 22% (rental cars)
and 37% to 5% (taxis).55
Ride sharing is not yet profitable for the leading US enterprises, at least
in terms of traditional accounting metrics of profit. According to the Lyft
registration statement for its 2019 Initial Public Offering, “We have incurred
net losses each year since our inception and we may not be able to achieve
or maintain profitability in the future. We incurred net losses of $682.8
48
49
50

51
52

53
54

55

(n 47) 12, 37.
(n 47) 13.
‘Uber Technologies’ (Statista, 2019) 13 <https://www.statista.com/study/54895/uber-technologies/> accessed 9 December 2019.
(n 50) 16.
(n 50) 10. Based on an average of transactions from 50,000 users in each locality, this is
an imperfect statistic for purposes of determining market share, which might be better
analysed in terms of total spend or total rides in a particular locality.
(n 50) 10.
Michael Goldstein, ‘Dislocation and its Discontents: Ride Sharing’s Impact on the
Taxi Industry’ (Forbes, 8 June 2018) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelgoldstein/2018/06/08/uber-lyft-taxi-drivers/#4b601fec59f0> accessed 9 December 2019 (summarising a study by business travel software firm Certify); Richter (n 46).
ibid.
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million, $688.3 million and $911.3 million in 2016, 2017 and 2018, respectively.”56 Uber, likewise, disclosed, “We have incurred significant losses
since inception, including in the United States and other major markets.
We expect our operating expenses to increase significantly in the foreseeable
future, and we may not achieve profitability.”57 Despite that, recent news
reports suggest stock price increases for both companies based on earnings
by Uber meeting expectations.58 There is also the question of whether the
data being gathered on riders, which cannot be meaningfully represented in
accounting metrics, might nonetheless represent value that in hindsight will
demonstrate profitability even today.
In the US, ride sharing represents a substantial share on a per-user basis
of the overall sharing economy use. In 2018, 66 million adults in the US
used a sharing economy service. 16 million used sharing economy lodging
services. 18 million used ride sharing. 59 Another prominent sharing economy
use model, coworking spaces, had much less penetration in 2018, with less
than a million individual users.60

B.  Taxis and Ride Sharing – India
In the 2016 ‘Report of the Committee Constituted to Propose Taxi Policy
Guideline to Promote Urban Mobility’, the Indian Ministry of Road
Transport and Highways took an express position favouring a permissive
regulatory scheme to liberalise the shared mobility industry.61 The Report
reflects a response to the perceived failure of public transport infrastructure
to stem private car ownership and use and attendant congestion and pollution.62 It seeks to establish a national policy limiting regulatory impediments
to the growth of cab aggregators, while expressly permitting regulation
56

57

58

59

60
61

62

See, ‘Form S-1 Registration Statement – Lyft, Inc’ (1 March 2019) 21 <https://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759509/000119312519059849/d633517ds1.htm> accessed 9
December 2019.
See, ‘Form S-1 Registration Statement – Uber Technologies, Inc’ (11 April 2019) 12
<https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/000119312519103850/d647752ds1.
htm> accessed 9 December 2019.
Ryan Browne, ‘Traders are finally realizing the value of companies like Uber and Lyft,
Russian rival says’ (CNBC, 6 June 2019) <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/06/marketrealizing-value-of-ride-share-firms-like-uber-lyft-yandex-cfo.html> accessed 9 December
2019.
‘Sharing Services in the US’ (Statista, 2019) 6-8 <https://www-statista-com.proxy.ulib.
uits.iu.edu/study/56029/sharing-services-in-the-us/> accessed 9 December 2019.
ibid 28.
Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Report of the Committee Constituted to
Propose Taxi Policy Guideline to Promote Urban Mobility (2016) <https://smartnet.niua.
org/sites/default/files/resources/Taxi%20Policy%20Guidelines.pdf> accessed 9 December
2019.
Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (n 61) 8.
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designed to ensure safety, consumer protection, and fair terms of service
(including pricing).63
At the same time, by defining ride sharing enterprises as part of the taxi
market, India sought to close the regulatory gap the enterprises sought to
exploit – not being treated as taxi services because their sole literal service
was providing a transaction platform.64

i.  Many firms
The Indian taxi market stood at around $6.4 billion in 2016, and is forecast
to grow at a compound annual rate of 13.7% during 2017-2022, to reach
$14.3 billion. Surging demand for taxi services in India can be attributed to
changing lifestyles of travellers and increasing disposable income of consumers, especially in Tier-I and Tier-II cities. The market is witnessing increasing
traction as taxis offer hassle free travel experience to customers in addition
to various other tangible and intangible offerings such as booking convenience through mobile applications, air conditioning, educated and skilled
drivers, multiple payment options, 24×7 customer support, electronic fare
meters, GPS-enabled vehicles, etc.65
Uber Technologies Inc. and Ola (ANI technologies Pvt. Ltd.) are spending
heavily to expand pooled rides, a category considered the next big growth
driver for both cab hailing firms. Pooled rides account for 25-30% of overall
trips on Ola and Uber in key cities such as Mumbai, Delhi and Bengaluru.66
Both firms have either dropped fares or are running promotions for ride
sharing to attract new customers. For instance, Uber has capped carpooling
fares at `49 for the first 8 km in Delhi, Bengaluru and Chennai. Ola is offering Share Pass, a subscription-based service launched in November 2018 that
provides carpooling at a flat fare, and at a steep discount. Ola is also offering
a Share Pass for five trips at `1. Usually, the firm offers a five-ride pass for
`149, while the ones for 20 and 40 rides costs `249 and `349 per month,
respectively, for the first 8 km. Ola recently reported that more than 20
63
64
65

66

Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (n 61) 5-7.
OECD Report (n 5) 2-3.
‘India Taxi Market By User Segment (Individuals, Corporate & Tourist), By Payment Mode
(Cash, Online Payment & Mobile Wallets), By Vehicle Type (Premium/Luxury, SUV/MPV,
Hatchback & Sedan), By Taxi Type (Radio, Regular, Self-Driving), Competition Forecast
& Opportunities, 2012 – 2022’ (TechSci Research, October 2017) <https://www.techsciresearch.com/report/india-taxi-market/1450.html> accessed 9 December 2019.
See, for example, Manish Singh, ‘Uber Reaches 500 Million Rides in India, Reveals
Interesting Statistics’ (Gadgets 360, 3 August 2017) <https://gadgets.ndtv.com/apps/
news/uber-india-500-million-rides-uberpool-driver-rider-statistics-1733047> accessed 9
December 2019.
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million carpool rides had been pre-sold through its Share Pass subscription
offering.67
India’s growing transportation industry has even attracted foreign players such as Tripda, which launched in India in 2014. “We are focused on
long distance carpooling and inter-city rides and hope that India will be
among our top three markets apart from Brazil and USA in less than a year”
said Nitish Bhushan, country manager of Tripda in India. The company had
planned to expand to Mumbai next in order to sign on commuters on the
Mumbai-Pune highway,68 but saw its operations shut down in 2015.
BlaBlaCar is mostly preferred for long-distance inter-city travel while
Ola/Uber are preferred for shorter distances. In general,
With BlaBlaCar, the car owners have the opportunity to share their
long-distance ride with passengers traveling on the same route. Owners
do this by specifying the itinerary and price for the ride. Interested
co-travellers can coordinate with the car owner through a private messaging system of BlaBlaCar or over the phone. The co-travellers then
pay their contribution to the owners directly.69

ii.  Ola and Uber
According to fact-finding by the Director General for Competition, Ola is
the largest provider of app-based ride sharing in India. Ola is a domestic
firm with operations dating to 2010.70 It describes itself as a taxi aggregator and not a taxi company. In this way, it follows the business model of
Uber.71 Uber is second in market presence to Ola, having begun operations
in India in 2013.72 Although the business model differs from ‘radio taxis’,
67

68

69

70
71
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Sayan Chakraborty, ‘For Ola and Uber, India’s shared taxi market is the next battleground’
(Livemint, 6 June 2017) <https://www.livemint.com/Companies/zurwJmatKucNvacjRmwxLK/Shared-rides-the-next-battleground-for-Ola-Uber.html> accessed 9 December
2019.
Payal Ganguly and Aditi Shrivastava, ‘Startups offering ride-shares set to gain as taxi
aggregators face roadblocks across states’ Economic Times (Mumbai, 16 December 2014)
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/startups-offering-ride-sharesset-to-gain-as-taxi-aggregators-face-roadblocks-across-states/articleshow/45531225.
cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst> accessed
9 December 2019.
Archna Oberoi, ‘How BlaBlaCar works: Business Model and Revenue Streams’ (Daffodil,
13 March 2019) <https://insights.daffodilsw.com/blog/how-blablacar-works-businessmodel-and-revenue-streams> accessed 9 December 2019.
OECD Report (n 5) 2.
Fast Track Call Cab (P) Ltd v ANI Technologies (P) Ltd 2017 SCC OnLine CCI 36, paras
7-12.
OECD Report (n 5) 2.
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which own their cars rather than operate platforms where drivers and riders
interact, the Director General concluded the Ola was a substitute for radio
taxis. However, despite greater than 60% market share, Ola was not a dominant player due to substantial competition from Uber and an eroding market
share.73
Ola and Uber each provide substantial competitive constraint on the other’s possible dominance. Evaluating allegations of abuse of dominance by
Ola, the CCI held that market share is an inadequate measure of competitive position in the market for cab aggregators.74 Fierce competition by Uber
and a lack of switching costs, including the presence of multi-homing (consumers using brands interchangeably), rendered Ola’s substantial share in
the particular city in question unconvincing. According to the CCI’s OECD
report, there are cases involving group ownership arguments through which
Ola’s and Uber’s shares might be aggregated for the purpose of determining
dominance.75
Because the existing investigations and litigation in India regarding ride
sharing turn on questions of dominance, the Anderson-Huffman analysis of
the sliding scale of integration, and its interplay with the degree of coordination, is not readily applied.

IV. A ntitrust

for a

World

of

Self Employment

Ride sharing is the most prominent application of sharing economy technologies and enterprise structures, but the world of self-employment is not
limited to ride sharing. Instead, the possibility of low-to-zero transaction
cost contracting raises the possibility of revolutionising nearly any services
market. As I describe above, these markets will be populated by a functional
infinity of suppliers and of consumers, each lacking any bargaining power
vis-à-vis each other. This leaves three areas of likely concern for antitrust
inquiry: (1) conspiracy among individual suppliers, either en masse through
the sharing economy enterprise as intermediary or in isolated localised
sub-markets; (2) abuse of dominance by the enterprise itself, harming either
competitors (and thus competition) or consumers or suppliers on either side
of the platform; and (3) mergers or consolidations involving enterprises.

73
74
75

OECD Report (n 5) paras 9, 12-13, 22-23.
OECD Report (n 5) 6.
OECD Report (n 5) 7.
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A.  Market Definition
The first step in any antitrust analysis of sharing economy enterprises will
be that of market definition. The enterprise, as that concept is used here and
in prior scholarship, is comprised of a functionally infinite number of suppliers, a matching service (platform) and a seeming infinity of transactions
among suppliers and consumers. Courts and commentators have struggled
with whether the market is best understood to be: (1) the service in which
the enterprise operates (e.g., ride sharing enterprises in the taxi market); (2)
a narrower market specific to the sharing economy nature of the enterprise
(e.g., a market for app-based ride sharing); or (3) a market for matching
suppliers with consumers. If the definition is the third, there are at least two
markets in sharing economy enterprises – the market for matching and the
market for supplying rides. Which market is used will influence the subsequent analysis of antitrust theories.
The correct answer, for most antitrust analyses, is to treat the enterprise as
straddling two markets – one for matching and one for services. The matching market is populated by sharing economy platforms, and in most jurisdictions, is likely to be oligopolistic or monopolistic. The matching market
has natural monopoly characteristics, with high up-front costs (developing
the app, developing an installed user base) and lower marginal costs (selling
the app after achieving market penetration).76 Further, the matching market
boasts both direct and indirect network effects, whereby increased use of an
app heightens its value to all users, making it more likely that a new user will
opt for the existing app rather than a new entrant.77 The matching market is
also the market in which entry barriers are greatest, because of the need to
enter at scale to compete against substantial positive network externalities
enjoyed by existing firms.78
The services market will be populated by sharing economy enterprises as
well as old-economy firms and in some cases, even individual entrepreneurs.
76
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See generally, N Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Microeconomics (6th edn, Southwestern
2012) 302 (natural monopoly where the high up-front costs are continually diluted by
increased use).
See, Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, ‘Two-Sided Markets: An Overview’ (2004)
Institut d’Economie Industrielle Working Paper <http://web.mit.edu/14.271/www/rochet_
tirole.pdf> accessed 9 December 2019; Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian, Information Rules:
A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (1st edn, HBS Press 1999) 173-226 (discussing
the phenomenon of network effects and their importance as entry barriers); David Evans
and Richard Schmalensee, Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms
(1st edn, HBR Press 2016) 21, 22, 25 (defining direct and indirect network effects and the
resulting ‘first mover advantage’).
Evans & Schmalensee (n 77).
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Thus, a sharing economy enterprise in a ride sharing market competes with
taxis, while a sharing economy enterprise in a lodging market competes with
hotels. How to understand the services market is a more complicated question, depending on whether the enterprise is treated as a single entity or as a
contract relationship among atomistic suppliers and the platform.
India defines app-based ride sharing enterprises as ‘cab aggregators’, a
regulatory classification that encompasses Uber, Ola, and like enterprises. A
cab aggregator is “a digital intermediary or market place for a passenger to
connect with a driver for the purpose of transportation.”79 This reflects an
approach that highlights the role of the platform, rather than the enterprise
in its entirety, in the market definition process. There is not a comparable
announcement on a nationwide basis of how markets will be defined in the
US, likely because of the lack of public investigation of sharing economy
industries and the failure of private litigation to reach the highest-level court.
For example, in its 2016 report on the sharing economy, the US Federal Trade
Commission did not make an effort to define possible antitrust markets.80

B.  Dominance
From the perspective of competition policy, most of the interest worldwide in
sharing economy markets has been in the area of abuse of dominance, with
Ola or Uber the target of a private or public enforcement action. Dominance
as a theory might be argued in either a market for matching (the service provided by the platform) or a market for the service provided by the enterprise
(e.g., taxi services). Under the latter market definition, courts in the US have
correctly been reluctant to find dominance, based on the ease of entry into
ride sharing and insufficient evidence of dominant market share.81
Dominance is an odd theory of harm in the sharing economy space for
a host of reasons. These include: (1) small firms (relative to old economy
analogies); (2) ease of switching; (3) seeming ease of entry; and (4) localised
markets.

79
80
81

(n 9).
See generally, FTC Report (n 3).
See, for example, Philadelphia Taxi Association v Uber Technologies 886 F 3d 332 (2018),
341-42 (3d Cir) (no “dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power” in the presence of low entry barriers and no allegations of market share); DeSoto Cab Co v Uber
Technologies Inc 2018 US Dist LEXIS 226261, 20-27 (ND Cal) (dismissing monopolisation claims under US law on the basis of a lack of barriers to entry and a lack of a dangerous
probability of recouping losses incurred through monopolisation).
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i.  Small firms
Initially, the firms serving as platforms in sharing economy enterprises may
not themselves be impressively large, relative to old-economy counterparts.
The service providers are not treated as employees except in jurisdictions
where an employment relationship is decreed by law. The platform does not
own the vehicles, or other capital assets used to provide services – a fact
that may be changing as firms like Uber experiment with self-driving vehicles. Uber’s market valuation immediately after its initial public offering was
$75 billion, a substantial sum but less impressive for a competitor to taxis
in 65 countries and 600 cities worldwide.82 In the absence of large size, a
ride sharing platform’s competitive advantage relies largely on technological
advantage, including the quality of the software deployed and the use of data
to enhance transaction efficiency.

ii.  Switching
Switching between sharing economy enterprises is relatively simple for both
consumers and suppliers. This is because signing up for an app requires single digit minutes and involves merely entering basic personal information
and payment details. Evidence suggests that both consumers and suppliers
‘multi-home’, using more than one platform either to provide or to consume
services. Multi-homing and other factors ensuring ease of switching are regularly cited as evidence that sharing economy enterprises lack market power
sufficient to give rise to theories of abuse of dominance.83 In the absence of
a lock-in effect from joining an app, of the sort that consumers experience
in signing up for a particular technological standard (whether operating system, music streaming format, or the like), it is difficult to state a theory
under which even substantial market share is likely to lead to a price or
quality effect.

iii.  Easy entry
Entry has been assumed to be easy in app-based markets because: (1) existing world-beating firms owe their start to small cadres of thinly-capitalised
entrepreneurs; (2) the existing technology industry is populated by extremely
high-valued firms, such as Google, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft, each flirting with $1 trillion in market capitalisation, who can enter or fund entry on a
82

83

Mansoor Iqbal, ‘Uber Revenue and Usage Statistics (2019)’ (Business of Apps, 10 May
2019) <http://www.businessofapps.com/data/uber-statistics/> (accessed 9 December
2019).
Yaraghi and Ravi (n 1) 19 (differentiating sharing economy enterprises from social networks because of the lack of lock-in effects).
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whim; and (3) private venture capital is available to fund promising start-up
enterprises. A 2017 analysis of the sharing economy in India supports the
ease of entry hypothesis, noting “new start-ups being registered every week
which offer new products and services using digital platforms.”84
A counterpart to the ease of entry story is the combination of network
effects and the treasure trove of data held by first movers. These factors are
frequently cited as evidence that start-ups will not be able to penetrate existing markets. There is reason to believe these facts are not as important as
they might seem. Data for sharing economy markets can be expected to have
localised value. Thus, data from US consumers is unlikely to be valuable
when marketing to consumers in India (and vice versa). Even within a country, at least one as large and economically and culturally diverse as India or
the US, data from one local market may not be meaningful in a different
local market. As possible proof of this claim, Uber’s success has largely been
in western markets, with regional competitors Ola (India), Yanex (Russia),
Didi (China), and Grab (Vietnam) out-competing, and in three of those
examples, actually eliminating the competitive threat from Uber.

iv.  Localised markets
Much of the story regarding dominance in the sharing economy relates to
the sheer worldwide or nationwide scope of the leading firms.85 Another
approach suggests that dominance may be best viewed as a function of local
rather than worldwide markets. Ride sharing enterprises have characteristics
of both: (1) nationwide or worldwide, and (2) localised, markets.86 In support
of the broader geographic market definition, consumers might be expected
to choose among competing sharing economy enterprises based in part on
geographic reach, including worldwide brand penetration – making sheer
scale a competitive feature. In support of the narrower market definition,
consumers can, and do, ‘multi-home’, selecting among competitors at a local
level. For example, a world traveller might have an Uber app, a Didi app, a
Grab app, and an Ola app, all on the same smartphone, and select the one
best suited to the particular geography on a given day. Which effect – preference for broad reach or preference for local options – outweighs which is
ambiguous. This undermines an argument that worldwide scale equates to
dominance in any one locality.
84
85
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Yaraghi and Ravi (n 1) 5.
For example, Hubert Horan, ‘Will the Growth of Uber Increase Economic Welfare?’ (2017)
44 Transportation Law Journal 33, 64-69.
See, Francesco Russo and Maria Luisa Stasi, ‘Defining the Relevant Market in the Sharing
Economy’ (2016) 5 Internet Policy Review 8-9 <https://policyreview.info/node/418/pdf>
accessed 9 December 2019.
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Features of sharing economy enterprises that serve to limit entry, including
the scalability of data resources, are muted in the case of localised markets.
This is because individual consumers are (primarily) local, so data regarding
riders in one city necessarily excludes the conduct of riders in a different city.
It is also because cultural, ethnic, religious, economic, or other differences
between cities, states, or nations, render algorithms that facilitate competition in one place less valuable in another. As an example, an algorithm might
predict the importance of having cars available at the airport, based on travel
habits of the population on which the algorithm is based. If the population
of another city has different travel habits, the algorithm will be of limited
use. For that reason, sheer worldwide scale is of limited importance when
competition is localised. This conclusion is bolstered by the reality of limits
on the success of globally dominant players in specific geographic locales.87

C.  Agreement/Conspiracy
Conspiracy is and will remain an area of substantial concern in the context of the sharing economy, which at its core, reflects interconnected markets populated by a large number of individual participants. Anderson and
I made this the central thrust of our 2017 article,88 where we argued for a
‘quick look rule of reason’ approach to analysing the hub-and-spoke agreements among providers on a sharing economy enterprise. Those agreements,
covering price, output, quality, choice, and innovation, strike at the heart of
competitive concerns, but they also make possible a unique level of integration that approaches that of a single firm.
The question remains how to treat a theory of harm based on agreement,
including: (1) whether the hub-and-spoke conspiracy approach will be followed; (2) what is the approach in a jurisdiction without a middle ground
‘quick look’ approach like that in the US; (3) what arguments might exist
that undermine the necessity of coordination to achieve the integrative efficiencies? Another question relates to suppliers on a sharing economy enterprise, such as drivers in the case of ride sharing, seeking to organise as de
facto employees, including whether such organisation itself presents a cartel
problem.

i.  Hub-and-spoke conspiracy
Hub-and-spoke conspiracy exists where horizontal competitors reach
explicit or implicit agreement through an intermediary, perhaps without ever
87
88

See, subpart B.iii, above.
See, Anderson and Huffman (n 12)
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communicating among themselves. Examples outside of the sharing economy include the Apple e-Books case in the US, where Apple was found to
have served as the hub, orchestrating an e-Book pricing conspiracy among
e-Book publishers.89 The legal consequence, liability per se under Section 1
of the Sherman Act, was upheld on appeal.90
According to its UNCTAD Submission, the CCI has also considered the
possibility of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy in the context of a platform enterprise. Noting two examples of possible hub-and-spoke relationship cartels
that were instead investigated as vertical agreements, the CCI summarised
its view as follows: “The CCI is however, aware that even if firms that are
distributors do not directly communicate with each other, the fact that they
use the supplier as an intermediary or backchannel medium to communicate should not exculpate them from any liability.”91
The CCI’s summary reflects a correct understanding of the hub-andspoke possibility in the sharing economy. However, when applied in the
context of ride sharing, the CCI abandoned the hub-and-spoke concept in
the absence of proof of communication between suppliers in a sharing economy enterprise. The CCI’s UNCTAD Submission described its investigation
into the centrally established prices in the Uber enterprise.92 Quoting the
CCI’s dismissal of the hub-and-spoke argument, the UNCTAD Submission
concludes that Uber drivers’ “acced[ing] to the algorithmically determined
prices by the platform (Ola/Uber) . . . cannot be said to be amounting to
collusion between the drivers.”93 The CCI would require an “agreement
between drivers inter-se to delegate this pricing power”, a stronger showing
than is required under US law – and a stronger showing than the UNCTAD
Submission itself suggests the CCI would require.94
The CCI’s approach in Agrawal v. ANI Techs./Uber may violate basic
common law rules regarding what constitutes an agreement among
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competitors, but it likely leads to a result that is consistent with optimal outcomes. I observe below that the Competition Act does not have an obvious
analogue to the abbreviated rule of reason analysis Anderson and I argued
for in 2017. In its lack, another mechanism is required to preserve the possibility of platform-based ride sharing without exempting entire industries
from competition scrutiny. In Agrawal, the CCI recognised the ability of
drivers to reach agreement on basic terms of service, including algorithmic
price terms, without violating competition laws.

ii.  Analysis in the absence of ‘quick look’
The quick look rule of reason serves as a middle ground between automatic
illegality, or per se treatment, and the full rule of reason analysis that proves
overly burdensome for most plaintiffs, whether public or private enforcers.95 It is a procedural tool that permits effective prosecutions of facially
harmful conduct while retaining in defendants the ability to defend against
claims with evidence of pro-competitive benefits. The US approach to a middle ground might be described as a non-standard, “an enquiry meet for the
case.”96 Professor Cavanaugh describes the ‘quick look’ as “tailor-made for
restraints that bear a close family resemblance to price fixing, but are of
the type with which courts have little experience or are idiosyncratic in
nature.”97
Not every jurisdiction has such a procedural mechanism. In the EU, for
example, Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(‘the TFEU’) distinguishes between automatically illegal conduct98 and conduct exempt from automatic illegality, “which contributes to improving the
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic
progress.”99 There is no explicit middle ground, although debates exist as to
whether a ‘continuum’ approach that approximates the US system’s quick
look analysis is emerging in application.100
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The Competition Act is closer in form to US antitrust law than to the
TFEU. It prohibits agreements that “cause[] or [are] likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within India.”101 The Competition Act
then exempts from that prohibition “any agreement entered into by way of
joint ventures if such agreement increases efficiency in production, supply,
distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services.”102 One author, however, argues that the delineation in India is explicit;
for agreements not treated as illegal per se, liability requires “conclusive
[proof] on fact that they cause or are likely to cause an appreciable adverse
effect on competition.”103
In the absence of a quick look approach, a tribunal evaluating ride-sharing agreements must make a determination of whether to treat the agreement on prices and other competitive terms under a per se rule or under a
rule of reason – unless the agreement is not a matter of concern because it
is considered to take place within the contours of a firm. Research does not
uncover cases alleging conspiracy in any jurisdiction that have proceeded to
the merits of the claim.104 The CCI’s approach of declining to treat the Uber
drivers’ vertical agreements with the platform as representing a horizontal
conspiracy is a sort of middle ground, producing an outcome not terribly
unlike one a quick look analysis might produce.

iii.  Ride sharing without coordination
The crux of an argument sceptical of competition law intervention in ride
sharing, in the face of the substantial concerns for anticompetitive coordination when individual providers reach agreement through the platform on
terms of service including quality and price, is the benefit of ride sharing and
the belief that coordination is essential to the functioning of a ride sharing
market. It is that sort of argument that underlay Anderson’s and my advocacy for a quick-look rule of reason. A response is that even in light of the
gains from ride sharing, there may be substantially less restrictive ways to
accomplish those gains.
101
102
103

104

The Competition Act 2002, s 3(1).
The Competition Act 2002, s 3.
Shruthi Anand, ‘Revisiting Per Se vs Rule of Reason in Light of the Intel Conditional
Rebate Case’ (The Centre for Internet and Society, 4 October 2017) <https://cis-india.
org/internet-governance/blog/revisiting-per-se-vs-rule-of-reason-in-light-of-the-intel-conditional-rebate-case> accessed 9 December 2019.
One such allegation, in Meyer v Uber Technologies Inc, initially appeared ready to proceed
to merits when the trial court held that the arbitration clause in the rider agreement was not
enforceable. On appeal, the trial court decision was reversed, and the case was dismissed
in favour of arbitration. 868 F 3d 66 (2017), 70, 80 (US Court of Appeals holding that the
arbitration clause was enforceable).

450

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 15

Arguments exist that the degree of coordination present in an Uber-style
ride sharing app is unnecessary to achieve the objectives of integration.105
Uber’s price and quality coordination, including everything up to rules
regarding the kind and condition of the automobile and the driver’s fitness
for duty as well as the obvious price term, ensures that a passenger need
not engage in the challenging process of searching for or of negotiating an
individualised transaction. Fundamentally, Uber’s coordination solves the
three problems presented by anonymity – search costs, transaction costs,
and trust. Of those, a ride-sharing economy enterprise would fail if it did not
overcome the trust barrier – and if it did not fail, credible arguments would
exist for regulatory intervention in any event. Search and transaction costs
speak instead to the speed and ease of arranging a transaction. It is possible
those parameters can be relaxed without undermining the enterprise in its
entirety.
In fact, all cartel agreements serve the basic goals of reducing search and
transaction costs. For example, an agreement to divide markets ensures
consumers have access to only one supplier; an agreement to fix prices or
quality ensures consumers need not devote time and energy to comparison
shopping.106 Competition necessarily increases costs of transacting in favour
of improved transaction terms brought about by the competitive environment. The possibility that efficiency of search and transaction may overcome
competitively determined transaction terms would upend core principles of
economic policy based on competitive markets.
One could argue that a ride sharing enterprise should limit its ambitions
to: (1) matching and (2) resolving the trust problem, but ignore the fixing of
transaction terms. This would be an Uber-style app that would match rider
with driver and offer a simple means to negotiate terms – necessarily slowing
the process but ensuring competition on terms of service. A version of this
argument would limit the area for competition to price, on a theory of consumer incapacity to evaluate quality, including safety, on an expedited basis.
Such a ride-sharing enterprise would offer to consumers a menu of options
including driver ratings and offer prices, letting the consumer select quickly
the combination of rating and price that best matched his or her needs.
Drivers, in turn, would bid on rides, presumably by setting a maximum discount rate from a baseline figure. It is ambiguous whether this reduction in
105
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coordination would bring with it the expense of the high, and efficient, level
of integration ride sharing enterprises offer.
In fact, at least one enterprise, founded in Russia, follows this model.
inDriver offers what it bills as a “fully transparent model” in which riders
bid for a route and negotiation occurs before other terms of service are disclosed.107 As of this writing, inDriver boasts substantial growth, with 24,000
users in more than 200 cities and 300 million rides completed.108 News reports
indicate that in Driver manages the complexity of real-time negotiation by
app by allowing negotiation above an offered fare in 10% increments.109
Passengers can also choose among competing bids while considering quality
indicia including ratings, arrival time, and vehicle information.110

iv.  Agreement through labour organisation
The coordination concerns discussed in this subpart relate to the phenomenon of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, arranged by the platform, targeting consumers as the victim. There are other ways to identify conspiracies involving
the suppliers on a sharing economy platform, both targeting consumers and
targeting the platform. Receptivity to such claims will differ depending on
a particular jurisdiction’s tolerance of labour interests as a justification for
restraints on competition.

a. Labour conspiracy, consumer as victim
The most overt, and almost certainly universally illegal form of supplier conspiracy against consumers in the context of a sharing economy enterprise is a
horizontal, off-platform agreement among suppliers to influence the terms of
service. If such an agreement is orchestrated through the platform, it implicates the complex interaction between competitive harm and efficiencies discussed above. Where such an agreement is off-platform, it has characteristics
of a pure supplier cartel and should be treated as such.
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As an example, recent news reports from the US market suggest that drivers on platforms including Uber may be agreeing to manipulate the surge
pricing algorithm, collectively turning off their apps to reduce the number
of drivers in a particular locality to induce surge pricing, before turning the
apps back on to take advantage of the price increase.111 Instances of such
conduct have been observed nationwide in the US, but appear to be more
concentrated in locations where drivers gather – for example, in ride share
lots on airport grounds.
This agreement, if provable, is a hard-core cartel seeking to manipulate
prices on the basis of a known algorithm for price setting. It is comparable to
the rate-fixing cartel carried out in the context of the LIBOR, whereby cartel members manipulated the rate through a concerted practice of false rate
reporting.112 Fair unanimity in treatment of cartel conduct among jurisdictions suggests this result will be the same in whatever jurisdiction is analysed.

b. Labour conspiracy, platform as victim
Another conspiracy concern is arising relating to the phenomenon of possible
labour organisation outside of the ordinary legal structures for labour union
conduct. According to a leading treatise on US antitrust law, competition
law principles and labour organisation principles are in tension, and must
be resolved by balancing between the goals of the respective fields of law.113
US law carve-outs for labour organisation exist in the context of collective
bargaining and related activities by a labour union, as well as for a list of
labour activities not involving union conduct.114 The carve-outs do not completely exempt employees from antitrust liability for conspiracy in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.115 For example, trial lawyers were held to
violate Section 1 by agreeing not to accept court-appointed representations
below an agreed amount.116
111

112

113

114
115
116

See, for example, Dalvin Brown, ‘Could Uber, Lyft drivers trick the apps to increase
surge pricing? Experts say probably’ (USA Today, 15 May 2019) <https://www.usatoday.com /story/tech/2019/05/15/uber-lyft-drivers-can-probably-manipulate-appscharge-you-more/3678461002/> accessed 9 December 2019.
See, Gelboim v Bank of America Corp 823 F 3d 759 (2016), 770-71 (2d Cir) (The US Court
of Appeals holding that LIBOR interest rate manipulation allegations stated antitrust claim
under s 1 of the Sherman Act).
Earl W Kintner and Joseph P Bauer, Federal Antitrust Law (Anderson Publishing Company
1989) s 72.1.
ibid ss 72.1-72.7.
15 USC, s 1.
Federal Trade Commission v Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association 1990 SCC OnLine
US SC 11 : 107 L Ed 2d 851 : 493 US 411 (1990), 428-36 (finding per se illegal agreement
under US law when lawyers who were unaffiliated in employment reached an agreement
not to accept court appointed representations for less than an agreed fee). cf National

2019

COMPETITION LAW LIMITS ON RIDE SHARING ENTERPRISES

453

The approach to labour conspiracies in Europe is more permissive, under
the general rule that employees, who are not ‘undertakings’, are necessarily
outside the scope of Article 101 of the TFEU.117 This carve out for employees
would not apply in the case of drivers reaching cartel agreements off-platform, with consumers as victims, as individuals acting in the capacity of sole
proprietors meet the definition of an undertaking.118
The Competition Act expressly includes associations of ‘persons’ in its
primary prohibition on agreements, distinct from the language of Article 101
of the TFEU and from the statutory exceptions in US law.119 In the absence
of a labour exemption comparable to those found either in statute or as a
matter of interplay between competing legal schemes, coordination by drivers to affect prices or terms of service offered either by the enterprise, or by
consumers, presents a labour cartel concern under Indian competition law.

V. Conclusion
On attribute of the broad digitalisation of economic activity across the globe,
the sharing economy has produced unique enterprise structures in a range of
industries, most notably including ride sharing. Its effectiveness as an organisational structure is proved by its rapid worldwide spread and the development of a variety of free standing viable competitors at substantial scale in
most distinct regions of the globe. The success of the sharing economy in
supplanting old-world enterprise structures raises seemingly opposite questions – one, whether the sharing economy is somehow incompatible with
socially acceptable economic structures, and two, whether the sharing economy should be seen as advancing most natural enterprise organisation. If the
former, competition law might be a natural check on its growth and possible
dominance. If the latter, competition law may need adjustment or at least
careful application to avoid stifling a beneficial organisational structure.
Nowhere is the right answer to that question more crucial than in economies that are still on a rapid upward growth trajectory, like that in India.
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